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PREPARING MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES FOR 
TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS OF INTANGIBLES 
 





 This article provides guidance for multinational companies 
concerned about transfer pricing audits of intangibles, such as 
patents2 and trademarks.3 Advice focuses on assisting companies to 
prepare for a transfer pricing analysis to avoid potential tax 
problems with government auditors. This anticipatory perspective 
emphasizes the importance of detailed transfer pricing 
documentation. Advisers must understand what is likely to trigger a 
transfer pricing audit, particularly for intangibles, and how to 
respond to a transfer pricing audit. Encouraging multinational 
companies to enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement with 
selected governments should help minimize audit problems. 
Advisers should view litigation more as a last resort, even though in 




 1 Thomas C. Pearson is a Professor of Accounting at the University of Hawaii at 
Manoa. He graduated from New York Univeristy (NYU), LL.M. (2005), University of 
Denver, LL.M. (1987), Vanderbilt, J.D./M.B.A. (1984). The author is grateful for the 
guidance of H. David Rosenbloom, Member of Caplin & Drysdale and Director of the 
International Tax Program at NYU, and the insight from his Transfer Pricing course. 
The author also appreciates input from Cindy Lin, Gideon Mark, Anand Desai, and 
Jessica Kerner. 
 2 A patent provides various legal rights granted by a government to the patent 
owner to protect innovative technology. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-84(b)(1) (2005). 
 3 Trademarks exist to identify and protect a company’s goods. See, e.g., 26 
C.F.R. § 1.482-84(b)(3) (2005). 





 Recently, transfer pricing audits4 have occurred more 
frequently throughout the world; during the period 2000 to 2003, 
nearly half of all parent corporations5 of multinational companies6 
underwent a transfer pricing audit somewhere in the world.7 In 
addition, three-fourths of multinational companies surveyed 
expected a transfer pricing audit during the next few years,8 
anticipating even stricter government enforcement.9 The fact that 
the U.S. and U.K. are now complaining more about transfer pricing 
 
 
 4 An “audit” is an examination to obtain reasonable assurance to express an 
opinion. It typically involves planning, assessing internal controls, collecting evidence, 
and reporting the results. Cf. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND 
PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. Of 
Certified Pub. Accountants 1972), available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/ 
members/div/auditstd/AU-00150.PDF (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) (standards of 
fieldwork and standards of reporting). Various types of audits exist, such as financial 
audits and compliance audits. A “transfer pricing audit” is a type of tax audit that 
examines a multinational company’s financial statements and tax reporting 
compliance on transfer pricing authority to determine if the company needs to make 
adjustments for tax purposes. A multinational company may conduct its own internal 
transfer pricing audit, however, more commonly, and as used in this article, 
government tax auditors conduct external transfer pricing audits.  
 5 A parent corporation is often a global holding company, which is not 
necessarily located where the multinational company’s major headquarters for 
business operations are located.  
 6 A multinational company consists of corporations or similar multinational 
enterprise organizations operating in more than one country. Compare OECD, 
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX 
ADMINISTRATIONS, at G-6 (Glossary) (1998) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. 
 7 See Venessa Houlder, U.S. Revenue Service Gets Tougher on Multinational 
Manoeuvers to Avoid Tax, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at 5. 
 8 See ERNST & YOUNG, TRANSFER PRICING 2003 GLOBAL SURVEY 7 (2003) 
[herinafter GLOBAL SURVEY]. More frequently targeted for tax audits are the 
multinational companies from Switzerland, the Netherlands, the U.S., Sweden, and 
France. Id. at 11. 
 9 In fiscal year 2004, IRS enforcement efforts brought in a record $43.1 billion in 
enforcement revenue. Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, Enforcement Revenue 
Reaches Record in 2004 (prepared remarks)(Nov. 18, 2004). For fiscal year 2006, 
President Bush proposed an eight percent increase in enforcement funding while the 
IRS as a whole would receive only a four percent increase. See ALLEN KENNEY, IRS 
ENFORCEMENT GETS BUDGET BOOST; SERVICE, MODERNIZATION NOT SO LUCKY 
(2005), http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/nav.nsf/TNTFrame?Open &Login. The 
global economy challenges the IRS to assure the proper assessment and collection of  
worldwide income taxable to the United States. I.R.S., THE BUDGET IN BRIEF: FY 
2006, 8 (Feb. 2005).  





audits conducted outside their home countries rather than inside 
them10 illustrates the expansion of audits and underlines the 
importance of proactive preparation.  
 The increase in transfer pricing audits is itself an indication of 
the increasing importance of transfer pricing. In recent years, the 
number of transfer pricing audits has dramatically increased in 
many countries (e.g., France);11 moreover, some countries have 
expanded their transfer pricing focus to include small to medium-
sized multinational companies (e.g., Australia).12 In some countries, 
transfer pricing audits occurred for the first time in this period (e.g., 
India13 and Colombia).14 Aside from the greater number of audits, 
the audits themselves are more aggressive in many countries,15 
 
 
 10 See Competent Authority: Glaxo Case Not Seen Causing Harm to U.S.-U.K. 
Competent Authorities’ Relations, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 11 (May 
11, 2005). In 2004, multinational companies filed twice as many complaints with the 
U.S. competent authority about transfer pricings audits outside the U.S., resulting in 
adjustments to the affiliated foreign multinational company, as compared with 
complaints about U.S.-initiated transfer pricing adjustment cases. See Competent 
Authority: U.S., U.K., Japanese Officials Endorse Binding Arbitration for Unresolved 
MAP Cases, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 863 (Dec. 22, 2004) (statement of 
Robert Green, IRS, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, Director – International).  
 11 See, e.g., Gianmarco Monsellato, Transfer Pricing Audits on the Rise, 28 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 524 (2002) (“[T]ransfer pricing audits in France increased by 520% 
between 2000 and 2002”). See also France Remains Europe’s Toughest Enforcer on 
Transfer Pricing Issues, Practitioner Says, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 
301 (Aug. 4, 2004). But see France Limits Audits to Nine Months for Most Taxpayers, 
Gives More Rights, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 55 (May 25, 2005). 
 12 The Australian Taxation Office outlined its compliance program for 2004 to 
2005 to improve transfer pricing compliance with small to medium-size enterprises. 
See Paul Riley et al., Australia Steps Up Transfer Pricing Activity, THE ARM’S 
LENGTH STANDARD 3 (Feb. 2005) (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd., Australia).  
 13 See Ashish Aggarwal, Transfer Pricing: A New World Order, 
BUSINESSWORLD, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.businessworldindia.com/ 
Dec0803/indepth02. asp. 
 14 Ricardo Rosero, Colombia’s New Transfer Pricing Rules: A Sophisticated 
Approach, 11 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 937 (Mar. 5, 2003). 
 15 Aggressive enforcement of transfer pricing has occurred in Japan, Australia, 
South Korea, and China. See Steven Harris et al., The Path to Resolving Transfer 
Pricing Conflict, INT’L TAX REV., available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/ 
?Page=17&ISS=13156&SID=488112 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). In South Korea, 
intense scrutiny and lack of sufficient documentation often resulted in denied 
deductions for a significant portion of a multinational company’s management service 
fees. See Henry An, Korea’s New Basic Rulings on Transfer Pricing, 13 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 343 (Aug. 4, 2004). However, in 2004 South Korea’s concern 
about attracting foreign investment led to modifications to enhance consistency and 
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especially during the past few years (e.g., Korea).16 Greater rigor 
may be the result of auditors receiving sophisticated international 
tax training on transfer pricing audits (e.g., Thailand).17 Growth in 
transfer pricing audits and enhanced audit enforcement is expected 
to continue in the near future. 
 Multinational companies can therefore expect a larger number 
of audits throughout their organization and should be aware of the 
continually evolving nature of audits. Transfer pricing audits in 
some countries have switched from an exercise in documentary 
compliance to an examination of the substance of the reporting 
(e.g., Mexico).18 Elsewhere, the focus may be a combination of 
form and substance, which causes auditors to request transfer 
pricing documentation at the start of corporate audits (e.g., U.S.).19 
 
 
predictability. Separate transfer pricing audits will no longer occur if no indication 
exists that the taxpayer intentionally manipulated transfer prices. South Korea also 
reduced the scope of transfer pricing audits from five to three years. See Korea, 
ASPAC TAX NEWSL. (KPMG Int’l, Asia Pac.), Oct. 2004, at 12–14, 
http://www.kpmg.or.jp/resources/newsletter/tax/aspac200410_e.pdf. 
 16 The Korean National Tax Service (NTS) aggressively challenges situations in 
which a Korean manufacturing affiliate is converted into a contract manufacturer, a 
limited-risk distributor is claimed, or a multinational company uses non-Korean 
comparables. See Korea: Officials Challenging Commissionaires, Say Activities 
Create PE, Practitioner Says, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 299 (Aug. 4, 
2004) (statements of Yoon Hwan Son, Deloitte & Touche’s Seoul office). See 
generally Korean National Tax Service’s Basic Rulings for Transfer Pricing (Samil 
PricewaterhouseCoopers trans.) (released June 15, 2004, Seoul). 
 17 Thailand, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 940 Special Report No. 45 
(Jan. 19, 2005). As more tax officials in Thailand receive training in Australia, 
intangibles are expected to receive more attention. In addition, more valuation issues 
will arise when reviewing licensing agreements. Id. 
 18 See Oscar Campero et al., Mexico Takes New Approach to Transfer Pricing 
Audits, 36 TAX NOTES INT’L 861, 861–62 (2002). Although Mexico established a 
transfer pricing regime in 1997, it was not until after the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) review that it established transfer pricing 
standards on intangibles. See Moisès Curiel et al., SAT Publishes New Standards on 
the Migration of Intangibles, 5 PRAC. LATIN AM. TAX STRATEGIES 1 (Mar./Apr. 2005) 
available at http://www.wtexecutive.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section. 
Section_1021; see also OECD, PEER REVIEW OF MEXICAN TRANSFER PRICING 
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICES ¶ 12 (Mar. 2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/16/ 
34244429.pdf.   
 19 U.S. international examiners are to issue a written information document request 
for a copy of any transfer pricing documentation prepared by the taxpayer pursuant to 
section 6662(e) at the joint opening conference for each audit cycle. See Larry Langdon, 
Memorandum for LMSB Executives, Managers, and Agents re: Transfer Pricing 
Compliance Directive (Jan. 22, 2003), http://ftp.qai.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/transfer_ 
 





 Transfer pricing concerns assert increasing influence on tax 
treaties. These concerns have triggered revisions, as in the case of 
Japan,20 and even termination, as shown by Germany’s 2005 
decision to end its bilateral tax treaty with Brazil.21 Because the 
application of tax treaties to large companies is vital, governments 
ensure consistency by involving their tax-treaty personnel in the 
negotiation of large transfer pricing agreements.22  
 While literature exists on general transfer pricing concerns and 
methods, this is the first law review article to provide in-depth 
information and advice on transfer pricing audits for intangibles. 
Addressing transfer pricing audits of intangibles from a worldwide 
perspective is particularly helpful in advising multinational 
companies engaged in strategic planning.  
 Part III of this article will examine preparation for transfer 
pricing audits of intangibles and the required analysis and 
documentation. Part IV will discuss the problem of transfer pricing 
audit triggers and the audit itself. It will also offer suggestions on 
how auditors and governments should proceed. Part V will 
 
 
pricing_compliance_directive_03.pdf. Previously, examiners requested documents in 
thirty-five percent of the transfer pricing cases. More recently, they sought documents in 
fifty-five percent of the cases. KPMG LLP (U.S.), IRS Targets Transfer Pricing 
Compliance, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005), available at http://www. 
internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=12594&SID=470552&TYP
E=20. 
 20 See Charles Cope & David F. Chan, An Analysis of the New Japan-United 
States Income Tax Treaty, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 1119 (2003) (the revised tax treaty 
provides a time limit provided for making transfer pricing adjustments). Transfer 
pricing concerns in Japan extend beyond the U.S. treatment of Japanese multinational 
companies. For example, Japan imposed transfer pricing adjustments on multinational 
corporate group Suzuki in connection with its subsidiaries in South Africa, Colombia, 
Hungary, and Indonesia. The Toyota multinational corporate group had a Japanese 
assessment based on fees paid to its Singapore marketing subsidiary. See Japan 
Expanding Transfer Pricing Probes, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 522 (Oct. 
15, 2003).  
 21 Tax Treaties: Germany Cancels Tax Treaty with Brazil, Gives Transfer 
Pricing Disputes as Reason, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1230 (Apr. 27, 
2005) (Germany contended that Brazil’s minimum profit margin requirement for 
related party transactions violated the arm’s length principle, distorted risk allocations, 
and failed to reflect an open market). Deductibility of royalties and similar expenses in 
Brazil is limited to ranges between one and five percent. See Napoleao Dagnese & 
Carlos Eduardo Ayi, An Approach to Brazilian Transfer Pricing Practice, 13 TAX 
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 701 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
 22 I.R.M. 42.10.8.1.5, Negotiation and Approval of Bilateral and Multilateral 
APAs (Nov. 15, 1996), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part42/ch10s08.html. 
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investigate transfer pricing audits from both an administrative 
(focusing on Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs)) and judicial 
context (reviewing major cases and illustrating the risks of 
litigation).  
 
III. PREPARING THE TRANSFER PRICES OF  
INTANGIBLES FOR TAX PURPOSES 
 
 In anticipation of audits, companies need a clear and uniform 
approach to transfer pricing. To get started in the right direction, an 
adviser must meet with the appropriate company officials to 
determine the appropriate transfer pricing method23 to use in 
establishing the company’s transfer prices. In addition to clarifying 
who is responsible for implementing any changes and gathering 
necessary information, this discussion should also consider the 
potential financial results of this method and the information 
needed to provide the best support for these prices.24  
 
A. General Transfer Pricing Analysis and Its Complexities 
 
 In a transfer pricing analysis, multinational companies usually 
evaluate transactional facts and circumstances.25 The analysis 
generally compares the four factors discussed below: (1) functions, 
(2) risks, (3) economic conditions,26 and (4) contractual terms.27 
The relative importance of these factors depends on the pricing 
method used.28 For property or services,29 the analysis should also 
determine if any “embedded intangible” exists.30  
 
 
 23 Because transfer pricing methods are widely discussed in current literature, this 
article does not discuss them. 
 24 H. Thomas Davis, Transfer Prices in the Real World—10 Steps Companies 
Should Take Before It’s Too Late, 64 CPA J. 82 (Oct. 1994), available at http://www. 
nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/16373972.htm. 
 25 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(1) (2005). 
 26 Relevant economic conditions should consider the similarity of the geographic 
markets, the relative size and economic development in each market, whether the market 
is wholesale or retail, the market shares for transferred items, relevant location-specific 
costs, competition in each market, and the alternatives realistically available to buyer and 
seller. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iv) (2005). 
 27 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii) (2005).  
 28 Companies must conduct an analysis on the functions and risks of the various 
parties to the transactions. Governments usually expect companies to acquire 
 





1. Functions  
 
 A “functional analysis”31 helps identify the factors that create 
value in the intangible, the identity of the owner, the true nature of 
the property transferred, and the terms and conditions under which 
a related party uses the intangible.32 A functional analysis also 
identifies significant economic activities and the functions of 
related and unrelated taxpayers to determine the comparability of 
their transactions.33 Nevertheless, a functional analysis is not 
usually concerned with unrelated third-party transactions because 
each intangible is arguably unique. 
 In performing the functional analysis, a multinational company 
should take into account that government tax auditors will probably 
interview the operational personnel most familiar with the 
multinational company’s operations,34 as well as the preparers of 
the documentation.35 Because the tax department does not deal with 
detailed knowledge of products and marketing, the multinational 
company’s analysis and documentation preparation should involve 
non-tax personnel to ensure accuracy and credibility.  
 
 
supporting evidence on the comparability of the transaction before selecting the most 
appropriate pricing method and setting the actual transfer price.  
 29 I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.6, Property or Services (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html. 
 30 An “embedded intangible” exists if the value of the tangible property or 
service is affixed to it, such as a trademark. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-3(f) (2005). 
 31 A functional analysis for intangibles looks at marketing and distribution, 
advertising, and similar activities. Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i)(F) (2005). Other 
functions to analyze for intangibles can include research and development, product 
design and engineering, and embedded management services. Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-
1(d)(3)(i) (2005). 
 32 See Inland Revenue, Transfer Pricing Guidelines: A Guide to the Application 
of Section GD 13 of New Zealand’s Income Tax Act of 1994, 53 ¶ 409 (2000) (New 
Zealand), available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/file/ebde89456c78fc0/apx12-
10.pdf. 
 33 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) (2005). An example of part of the functional 
analysis is identifying royalty rates for trademarks. See Weston Anson, How to Make 
Transfer Pricing Work for IP and Intangibles, INT’L TAX REV. (Oct. 2004), available 
at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/default.asp?page=10&PUBID=35&ISS= 
12596&SID=470401.  
 34 See I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.1, Functional Analysis (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html. 
 35 See, e.g., Practitioners Say IRS Digging Deeper in Audits of Pharmaceutical 
Companies, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 83 (June 8, 2005). 





 A risk analysis evaluates the risks borne by the parties to 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions.36 The United States 
requires companies to perform a risk analysis within multinational 
corporate groups to determine which party in a controlled 
transaction bears the associated risks.37 The analysis must also 
consider whether income earned by the risk-bearing party is 
commensurate with the risks assumed.38  
 Market risks are the major risks to consider in each step of the 
transfer pricing analysis.39 Market risks include fluctuations in cost, 
demand, pricing, and inventory levels.40 As part of this risk 
analysis, the controlled multinational company’s conduct over time 
must remain consistent with the allocation of risks.41 In addition, 
the controlled multinational company must have the financial 
capacity to absorb the losses that might occur because of the risks 
assumed. 
 
3. Economic conditions 
 
 One economic factor multinational companies typically take 
into consideration in transfer pricing analysis is comparability 
adjustments42 for market share.43 Governments generally expect 
 
 
 36 See generally Robert T. Cole, International Strategy for Transfer Pricing 
Compliance: A Checklist for Multinationals, in PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER 
PRICING, ch. 26 (Robert T. Cole ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
 37 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) (2005). 
 38 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A) (2005). 
 39 Another risk arises if the controlled multinational company exercises managerial 
or operational control over the business activities that generate the income or loss. 26 
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) (2005). 
 40 Other risks include those related to the success or failure of research and 
development activities; financial risks, including fluctuations in foreign currency rates and 
interest rates; credit and collections risks; product liability risks; and general business risks 
related to the ownership of property, plant, and equipment. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-
1(d)(3)(iii)(A) 2005. 
 41 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2) (2005); I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.4, Contractual Terms 
(Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html. 
 42 For information on potential commercial databases to use in finding 
comparables, see Martine Cools, International Commercial Databases for Transfer 
Pricing Studies, 6 INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J. 167 (Sept./Oct. 1999); Richard A. Clark, 
Finding and Analyzing Comparable Financial Data app. 9C, in TRANSFER PRICING 
HANDBOOK (Robert Feinschreiber ed., 1998). 





evidence showing that a market share strategy is likely to produce 
future profits commensurate with implementation costs. 
Multinational companies can pursue this strategy for only a 
reasonably limited amount of time.44  
 Economic condition analysis also includes two other potential 
adjustments based on geographical market and location savings. 
Most governments are parochial in preferring transfer pricing 
product comparisons within the same geographic market; however, 
some governments allow consideration from the same economic 
region.45 Location savings arise from operating in a low-cost 
geographic location when the cost savings would increase the 
profits of comparable firms.46  
 
4. Contractual terms 
 
 Comparability for transfer pricing analysis also requires 
evaluating significant contractual terms, especially those affecting 
prices or profits. Examples of significant contract terms include the 
form of consideration; sales or purchase volume; warranties 
provided; right to updates; duration, termination, and renegotiation 
 
 
 43 Different market share strategies may exist to enter markets, to increase a 
product’s existing market share, or to meet competition, which may affect the price of the 
intangibles. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(i) (2005). 
 44 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-1(d)(4)(i)(A)–(B) (2005). Controlled taxpayers must 
document (1) the market share strategy, (2) the related costs and expected returns of 
the strategy, and (3) any agreement between the members of the multinational 
corporate group to share the related costs before they implement the strategy. 26 
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(i)(C) (2005). Companies must generally include a statement of 
the strategy, a detailed marketing plan that addresses resale prices and/or sales 
promotion activities, a breakdown of related startup costs, a budget that captures 
expected future profits, a time frame to pursue the strategy given the specific industry 
and product in question, and written evidence supporting the allocation of risks. 
 45 See Dirk Van Stappen, Pan-European Versus Country-Specific Searches and 
Pan European Versus Country-Specific Databases: Not a Clear-Cut Issue, 13 TAX 
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 222, 225 (July 7, 2004). If the same country 
information is not readily available, governments typically allow companies to use 
information from an uncontrolled transaction in a different, but similar, geographic market 
with appropriate adjustments for market differences. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(A) 
(2005).  
 46 The analysis must consider the competitive positions of buyers and sellers. 26 
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(C). See generally Diana Jiménez Moncada, Location Savings: 
Who Is Entitled to the Additional Profit?, 2005 TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING 
(June 2005). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 2 
 
168 
rights; collateral transactions, such as for ancillary or subsidiary 
services; and extension of credit and payment terms.47 Contractual 
terms may vary for each transaction.  
 
5. Other issues 
 
 Apart from the four comparative factors explained above, other 
issues such as cost sharing arrangements present another set of 
problems that companies should consider.48 These problems include 
which costs are shared, how these costs are shared, which values 
are attributable to the previously developed intangibles, and what 
terms are acceptable to the government authorities.49 In many 
countries, multinational companies consult with local accountants 
to determine what royalty rates are acceptable to the government 
tax authorities50 and which royalty rate to use for transfer pricing 
tax purposes.51 Whereas domestic firms usually set royalties at a 
uniform rate for tax purposes, multinational commercial companies 
typically create licenses with tiers of royalty rates based on net 
sales.52  
Instead of performing a transfer pricing analysis of each 
intangible, advisers sometimes recommend bundling each type, 
such as a technology licenses. Nevertheless, companies should 
prepare to defend an individual intangible that represents a 
significant amount of income or expenses, such as more than one 
percent of the multinational company’s gross income. Advisers 
 
 
 47 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A) (2005). 
 48 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002). The 
OECD refers to cost sharing arrangements as “cost contribution agreements.” 
 49 See MONICA BOOS, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: THE VALUATION OF 
INTANGIBLES 140 (2003).  
 50 Kingsley L. Taft, Joint Development Agreements, Presentation at the 
Practicing Law Institute’s Seminar on Patent & High Technology Licensing in New 
York City (June 1, 2005).  
 51 In Italy, royalties under two percent of sales are generally automatically 
accepted, while additional technical or legal factors, such as exclusive licensing, may 
justify royalties of up to five percent of sales. Royalties exceeding that amount are 
justified only in exceptional circumstances, such as licenses for cutting-edge 
technology or extraordinary facts. See Marc M. Levey, Italian Transfer Pricing 
Revisited: Differences from U.S. Rules Remain, 8 J. INT’L TAX’N 20, 23 (1997). 
Similarly, royalties in Vietnam are limited to a maximum of five percent of the net 
selling price or twenty-five percent after-tax profit. See Vietnam, 13 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-26 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
 52 Author’s discussion with Kingsley L. Taft, supra note 50. 





should consider lobbying countries to reward multinational 
companies that demonstrate integrity and limit scrutiny to 
companies that fail to assure legal compliance.  
 
B. Documentation of Transfer Pricing:  
A Necessary Compliance Burden 
  
Conducting a detailed transfer pricing analysis is a costly but 
necessary process due to the increased importance of 
documentation of transfer prices. Proper documentation is critical 
for five major reasons. First, more countries have enacted legal 
requirements governing documenting appropriate transfer prices.53 
Second, higher transfer pricing penalties may apply if multinational 
companies lack proper documentation. Third, multinational 
companies generally bear the burden of proof for their tax 
positions. Fourth, commercial reasons may exist, such as following 
best management practices to assure the efficient use of resources.54 
Fifth, documentation helps to reduce retraining costs upon the 
inevitable departure of critical people within the company. Proper 
documentation also requires that multinational companies take 
precautions in drafting the transfer pricing documents for their local 
companies to protect the confidentiality of their trade secrets and 
commercially sensitive data.55 
 In general, documentation requirements for tax purposes have 
increased worldwide.56 In at least twenty-two countries, 
multinational companies must prepare transfer pricing 
 
 
 53 See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at ch. V, Documentation (1995); I.R.M. 
4.61.4.4 Taxpayer’s Books and Records (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
irm/part4/ch46s04.html; see generally Marc M. Levey & David Balaban, Global 
Documentation–Many Considerations, ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. (Jan./Feb. 2004). 
 54 See TR 95/D23 (Draft Taxation Ruling), as modified by TR 98/11 (Australia). 
 55 See, e.g., Parties in GlaxoSmithKline Seek Confidential Information 
Protective Order, 106 TAX NOTES 781 (2005); see also Motions: IRS Must Reveal 
Number of Allegations of Tax Information Leaks by Japan’s NTA, 13 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 794 (Dec. 8, 2004). 
 56 Korea is an exception to the trend of increasing document requirements. In 
2005, Korea reduced the number of required documents from ten to three (statement 
of method of arm’s length price, statement of international transactions, and summary 
income statements of foreign-related parties). See Korea, Revised Documentation 
Rules by NTA, 17 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-79 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
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documentation for related company transactions;57 and at least 
fourteen other countries recommend transfer pricing 
documentation.58 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)59 created guidelines on transfer pricing. 
However, the OECD guidelines state, relatively weakly, that “the 
information relevant to an individual transfer pricing inquiry 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”60 
 The transfer pricing documentation burden varies among 
countries, in part because the burden depends on the volume and 
complexity of documents required by each government. The most 
common types of documents governments require from 
multinational companies are just for “basic documentation.” 
Generally, these include a description of transactions with related 
parties, the transfer pricing method selected for the analysis, an 
identification of comparables as well as any adjustments to them, 
and an explanation of the multinational company’s economic 
analysis.61  
 Some countries further require “moderate documentation,” 
which includes an overview of the multinational company’s 
business; a description of the multinational corporate group’s 
organizational structure and other documents, such as those that 
support the assumptions; conclusions; and positions taken in the 
multinational company’s transfer pricing documents.62 A few 
 
 
 57 DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, STRATEGY MIX FOR GLOBAL TRANSFER 
PRICING: PLANNING FOR METHODS, DOCUMENTATION, PENALTIES AND OTHER ISSUES 
18–19 (2006) (Countries requiring documentation are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Israel, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, 
Taiwan, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela). 
 58 See id. (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and Thailand). 
 59 The OECD consists of thirty countries with democratic governments and 
market economies. See About OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Mar. 13, 
2006). 
 60 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 5.16. A multinational company’s 
documentation files should include any cost-sharing or -contribution agreements, 
Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs), or rulings from a relevant government. Id. 
 61 See id. at 22–23, tbl.1 (“Categories of Documentation Required”); OECD 
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 5.18(iii) (1995) (organizational structure should show 
ownership linkages within the multinational corporate group). 
 62 See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23 (examples of 
countries with moderate documentation include China, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, Singapore, Spain, and Venezuela). See, e.g., Peter H. Dehnen & Silke 
 





countries also mandate “extensive documentation,” requiring 
written explanations as to why the company did not select 
alternative pricing methods, relevant data obtained after year-end, 
and/or an index to all the transfer pricing documents.63 Even if it is 
a good management strategy to require multinational companies to 
prepare an index to relevant documents, advisers should have their 
multinational corporate clients lobby to limit the compliance 
burden in transfer pricing to “moderate documentation.”  
 At least fourteen countries require another form of 
documentation, referred to as contemporaneous documentation, 
where taxpayers contemporaneously document their transfer pricing 
analysis.65 Contemporaneous documentation usually means the 
local company completes its documentation by the date the parent 
multinational company files its income tax return.66 A 
contemporaneous documentation requirement reduces discrepancies 
in appropriate transfer price that the company can otherwise only 
detect with hindsight.67 Contemporaneous documentation should 
also include how the multinational company allocates risks among 
members of a multinational corporate group.68  
 
 
Bacht, New Developments Regarding Transfer Pricing Documentation in Germany, 
BULL. FOR FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, May 2005, at 185. 
 63 DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23. For example, New 
Zealand, Peru, and the U.S. require a documentation index.  
 65 See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23 (indicating that 
countries requiring contemporaneous documentation include Australia, Canada, 
China, Germany, Hungary, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, 
Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela). 
 66 For companies, the cost of contemporaneous documentation can generally 
range from US$100,000 to over US$1 million. Gordon C. Millbourn III, Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration Report on Transfer Pricing, 12 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 532 (Oct. 15, 2003). 
 67 To qualify for an exception to the transfer pricing penalties, the multinational 
company must have used contemporaneous documentation to record a reasonable effort to 
determine its tax liability accurately in accordance with the required transfer pricing 
analysis. A failure to provide such documentation to the IRS within thirty days of a 
request creates the presumption that the taxpayer did not make the required reasonable 
effort. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (2005). 
 68 In 2004, Canada issued a directive mandating auditors to request 
contemporaneous documentation for non-arms-length transactions with non-residents. 
Can. Revenue Agency, Transfer Pricing Memorandum on Contemporaneous 
Documentation (Oct. 13 2004), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/non 
residents/common/trans/tpm05-e.html. The request should occur early in the audit or 
when the auditor first becomes aware of the transaction. Id. 
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 Coordinated “multi-country documentation”69 represents the 
efforts of several governments to coordinate the appropriate 
transfer pricing documentation when they need to analyze activities 
in multiple countries.70 Fewer than one-third of multinational 
companies prepare multi-country documentation even though such 
documentation might help identify tax-planning opportunities, 
provide consistency, mitigate audit risks, and result in 
documentation cost savings.71 Legal-language requirements are 
often a hindrance to pursuing multi-country documentation;72 
however, this documentation practice should significantly increase 
when the European Union (E.U.) eventually adopts a coordinated 
master-file documentation package for all E.U. countries73 that 
permits E.U. countries to require additional local documentation.74 
 
 
 69 Multinational accounting firms have begun to sell services that prepare “multi-
country documentation.” For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to its multi-
country documentation service as “Global Core Documentation.” See 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Core Documentation, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/ 
service.nsf/docid/178390e968285b8f85256fbf00582caa (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 70 The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Guidance of March 
12, 2003, does not impose any legal requirements greater than imposed by the relevant 
PATA country (U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan). Instead, PATA Guidance 
attempts to prevent costly duplicative administrative requirements. Pacific Association 
of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/common/trans/pata-e.pdf (last visted Mar. 
18, 2006).  
 71 See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 21. See generally, Gregory J. Ossi et al., 
The Search for Consistency: A Global Approach to Transfer Pricing Documentation, 
32 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 283 (2003).  
 72 Many countries do not accept transfer pricing documents in a foreign language 
(e.g., Greece and Portugal). Some countries will accept documents in English or another 
specified foreign language (e.g., Belgium and Spain). Other countries may require 
translation at the discretion of the tax administrator (e.g., Finland and Austria). European 
Union: Survey Finds EU Members Disagree Widely on Applying Arbitration 
Convention Provisions, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 131 (June 23, 2003). 
 73 In 2006, the E.U. is expected to adopt a proposed EU Transfer Pricing 
Documentation policy (where the E.U., not the U.N., must be modified). U.N. JTPF, 
21st Sess., 9th mtg., U.N. Doc JTPF/021/2004/EN (Sept. 16, 2004); accord EU 
Governing Body to Vote This Fall on EU Forum’s Documentation Proposal, 14 TAX 
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 16 (May 11, 2005).  
 74 See E.U. Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Draft Revised Secretariat Discussion 
Paper on the Masterfile Concept 10 ex.1, U.N. Doc JTPF/003/REV3/2004/EN (Sept. 
16, 2004). The reduced documentation should contain a transfer pricing analysis and 
all inter-company agreements. This includes licenses, services, contract research, and 
distribution agreements. An international examiner must obtain such agreements, 
related correspondence, and records. See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.6, Transfers of Intangibles 
 





  The quality and reliability of each multinational corporate 
group’s transfer pricing documentation varies widely. For example, 
the multinational corporate group’s documentation usually leans 
toward assisting tax compliance. This practice often weakens the 
quality and reliability of transfer pricing documentation. Therefore, 
once multinational companies experience transfer pricing audits, 
they have an incentive to modify their documentation practices 
when they witness the problems created by compromised 
documentation. The United States found that most multinational 
companies provided satisfactory documentation in 2000–01, with a 
trend toward improved compliance.75 In the United States, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s76 new internal control requirements have led to 
improved reliability by requiring a demonstration to external 
auditors of actual compliance.77 As a result, the auditors’ report on 
internal controls has created a “new world” for examining transfer 
pricing documentation since 2005.78  
 Although the quality of documentation produced by “small to 
medium enterprises” (SMEs) is often low,79 some governments 
have recognized that the standard is nevertheless an excessive 
burden—even when the multinational company receives third party 
 
 
(Jan. 1, 2002), at 9, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html# 
d0e442076.  
 75 See IRS Dir. of Large and Mid-Size Bus. Div., Fiscal Years 2000-01 I.R.S. 
Study: Effectiveness of Internal Revenue Code Section 6662(e) (Dec. 28, 2001) 
(response to the request from the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 106th 
Congress, 1st Session). 
 76 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2004).  
 77 A company must identify its transfer pricing policies and provide external 
auditors with evidence of actual compliance with those policies. If the auditor is unable to 
recognize and certify compliance with the multinational company’s policies, the U.S. 
multinational company may have to postpone filing its annual report with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Such an action usually shakes investor confidence 
in a multinational corporate group. See Molly Moses, Large Multinationals Taking 
Steps to Ensure Pricing Process Meets Requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Practitioners Say, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1091 (Mar. 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter Large Multinationals]. 
 78 Clark Chandler, Speaker at NYU in Prof. David Rosenbloom’s Transfer 
Pricing Class (Apr. 1, 2005). 
 79 Grant Thorton, Transfer Pricing, ASIA PACIFIC TAX ADVISER § 2 (Jan. 2005), 
available at http://www.gtjapan.com/english/ps/newsletter/0526_apta.pdf. 
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assistance in its analysis.80 In 2005, Australia, Canada, and 
Denmark each created a simplified approach to documentation for 
SMEs.81 In Australia, SMEs must accurately identify and record 
cross-border transactions, select an arm’s length method, and test 
the method to ensure an arm’s length result. The testing might be as 
simple as a basic benchmarking study. The SME must also 
implement a review process before completing the required tax 
form or schedule for its tax return.82 Other countries should also 
limit SME documentation requirements to a basic documentation 
standard.  
 Contemporaneous documentation by multinational companies is 
critical throughout the transfer pricing process. Governments need 
multinational companies to effectively provide sufficient transfer 
pricing documentation to audit companies. Failure to conduct 
appropriate analyses or to document transfer pricing policies could 
and should result in significant transfer pricing adjustments and 
related penalties. These costs should be transparent in either the 
company’s financial statements or security filings with a 
government’s securities regulator. The documentation requirements 
for SMEs, however, should not discourage worldwide business 
expansion merely because of expensive transfer pricing studies.  
 For complex technology licenses, multinational corporations 
should expect that more governments will require a clear diagram 
of the various licensing arrangements and property rights, and a 
summary of the royalty terms. Given that many multinational 
companies will engage in extensive cross-licensing and sub-
licensing, advisers may wish to ensure that tax auditors do not have 
to struggle to determine the basic facts about a multinational 
company’s assets and liabilities. Otherwise, multinational 
companies should expect tax auditors to take a more aggressive 
approach in making transfer pricing audit adjustments. 
 
 
 80 The OECD has recognized the need for balance between costs and administrative 
burdens. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6,  ¶ 5.28 (1996). 
 81 Austl. Tax Office, International Transfer Pricing: A Simplified Approach to 
Documentation and Risk Assessment for Small to Medium Businesses (2005) (NAT 
12032-03.2005) [hereinafter Simplified Approach]; CRA Info. Cir. 94-4R, APAs for 
Small Businesses (Mar. 18, 2005). See Denmark: Parliament Passes Bill Creating 
Penalties, Information Document Requirements, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING 
REP. 52 (May 25, 2005). 
 82 See Denmark: Parliament Passes Bill Creating Penalties, Information 
Document Requirements, supra note 80. 





IV. EXPERIENCING TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS OF INTANGIBLES 
 
 An adviser in a multinational corporate group should perform 
periodic spot-checks to ensure that transfer pricing is proceeding 
according to plan. New personnel or business problems may have 
created changes that the transfer pricing method does not reflect.83 
 
A. Justifiable Audit Triggers and Auditors’ Extensive  
Pre-audit Activities 
 
 While most multinational companies will usually not disregard 
the law, some believe their business strategies may place them 
dangerously close to questionable areas that exploit legal 
loopholes.84 The natural, but unfortunate, result is that governments 
require more detailed transfer pricing audits to ensure that 
multinational companies comply with a country’s transfer pricing 
legal requirements and the spirit of its law. 
 Planners should be aware of the range of appropriate transfer 
pricing audit triggers scrutinized by various governments.85 For 
example, the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency aggressively 
investigates intra-group costs allocated among related entities based 
solely on revenues.86 China primarily targets multinational 
 
 
 83 Davis, supra note 24, at 83. 
 84 See, e.g., Jim Killaly, Austl. Tax Office, Large Bus. and Int’l, Transfer Pricing 
Compliance Issues and Insights in the Context of Global Profit Allocation (Mar. 9, 
2000) (unpublished paper presented at the Transnational Crime Conference on file 
with author).  
 85 Audit triggers in Australia include sizeable interest-free loans, inappropriate 
payment of royalties, assumption of exchange risk without compensation, and Australian 
companies losing assets through restructuring. See Cubby Fox, Taking Aim at Transfer 
Pricing, May 2004 (PwC-Australia), http://www.pwc.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/docid/ 
D165D9792A8536C8CA256CE7000936F5.  
 86 Other audit triggers in Canada include: 1) inbound management services, priced 
at a cost plus mark-up or a royalty basis, 2) outbound management services that are priced 
at cost, and 3) product sales to related parties with pricing that differs from the amount 
charged to unrelated customers. See Gordon Denusik, CCRA Transfer Pricing Disputes, 
Inst. Of Chartered Acct. of B.C. (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.iac.bc.ca 
kb.php3?pageid=2328. Canadian business auditors have become increasingly skilled 
in identifying transfer pricing issues. The business auditors can refer the case to over 
220 specialized transfer pricing auditors in Canada. Ron Holowka, Early Stage 
Technology Tax Issues International Transfer Pricing, OTTAWA BUS. J. (May 28, 
2004). 
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companies with sustained losses,87 marginally profitable/loss 
making companies, and fluctuating profits.88 In New Zealand, audit 
triggers include commissionaire arrangements,89 stock option 
recharges or schemes, and regional or head office charges.90  
 Many countries, including the United Kingdom, have identified 
the following transfer pricing audit triggers: complexity of 
transactions, significant monetary values, changes in the audited 
entity’s taxable income, and the restructuring of multinational 
corporate group operations.91 Losses over a number of years are 
also of particular concern, according to the U.K.’s HM Revenue & 
Customs.92 Another trigger for further audit inquiry in the U.K. 
includes any changes in the multinational corporate group’s 
arrangements that purport to reduce risk and lead to reduced profits 
attributed to the local multinational company.93 Suspicious 
 
 
 87 See, e.g., Shu Wei, New Transfer Pricing Developments in China, DELOITTE 
TOUCHE TOHMATSU, July 2004, at 2, http://www.china.ahk.de/gic/biznews/law/ 
Bulletin_CTN0304E.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) (citing China’s Circular No. 70 
(Guo Shui Fa No. 70) (June 7, 2004) (regarding transfer pricing enforcement)). 
 88 For example, a distributor’s loss or substantially reduced profits might arise 
because of a fee paid to a related company abroad for the license. See China Tax/ 
Business News Flash: Who Will Be the Next Transfer Pricing Audit Targets?, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, June 2004, http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/chinatax_ 
news_jun2004_tp.html.  
 89 A commissionaire arrangement allows the commissionaire (often the local 
multinational company) to conduct business with the customer in its own name while 
the principal (often a related multinational company) maintains all inventory, 
operational, and sales risks. At year end, the local multinational company merely 
reports a commission based on sales volume for tax purposes. See Challenges to 
Popular Tax Structures: Tough Audit Issues for US Multinationals, MORGAN, LEWIS & 
BOCKIUS LLP MORGAN LEWIS ON GLOBAL TAX ISSUES, Nov. 2001, at 3, 
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/040C61CF-01AB-4B7F-A59AFB0FC9902E7B_ 
Publication.pdf. 
 90 See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 61 (New Zealand’s Fiscal Authority 
Approach). 
 91 See id. at 11, fig.3. 
 92 In 2005, the U.K.’s Inland Revenue was consolidated with “HM Customs and 
Excise” and renamed “HM Revenue and Customs.” See Commissioners for Revenue 
and Customs Act 2005 c. 11 (Apr. 7, 2005). Such continued losses might arise from a 
multinational corporate group policy. See, e.g., INTM 461150—Transfer Pricing: Case 
Selection—Particular Factors Influencing Case Selection—Losses Over a Number of 
Years, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk 
/manuals/intmanual/INTM461150.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).  
 93 See INTM 461060—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—The Scope and Degree 
of Transfer Pricing Problems, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at 
 





restructuring changes include full service distributors becoming 
commissionaires, license manufacturers becoming contract 
manufacturers, research and development expertise switching from 
a royalty basis to a contract basis, and the addition of cost sharing 
arrangements.94  
 The division of intangibles among a multinational corporate 
group is likely an improper transfer pricing tactic and a major 
potential audit issue. For example, the payment of significant 
management fees or royalties or payment for the use of 
intangibles95 are common factors that raise concerns and increase 
the chances of audit case selection.96 The U.K. instructs its tax 
agents “to review the full facts, use common sense, and exercise 
judgment taking into account how a third party would have acted 
before reaching any conclusion.”97 Similarly, the acquisition or sale 
of intangibles often raises governmental audit inquiries.98  
 A cross-border reorganization usually triggers a transfer pricing 
audit, especially if valuable intangibles exist. For example, in the 
United States,99 cross-border reorganizations are not taxable100 
 
 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461060.htm (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2006).  
 94 UK Inland Revenue Cracks Down on Transfer Pricing Planning, MCDERMOTT 
WILL & EMERY NEWSL. (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuse 
action/publications.nldetail/object_id/068663cb-9fb9-46af-a8ab-de358a6dec4a.cfm. 
 95 See, e.g., INTM 461170—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Particular 
Factors Influencing Case Selection—Charging for the Use of Intellectual Property, 
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/ 
intmanual/INTM461170.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).  
 96 Questions arising from large management and service fees include whether the 
multinational company has a capable management team, whether the fees are large 
enough to reduce the company’s profits to negligible amounts, whether the fees are 
paid to a company in a tax haven, and whether the fees are new. See INTM 461160—
Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Particular Factors Influencing Case Selection—
Payment of Significant Management Fees or Royalties, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 
available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461160.htm 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006).  
 97 See INTM 464090—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transactions—Intangibles; 
Fragmentation, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue. 
gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM464090.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).  
 98 Id. 
 99 See Jeffrey L. Rubinger et al., Holding Intangibles Offshore May Produce 
Tangible U.S. Tax Benefits, 37 TAX NOTES INT’L 907 (2005).  
 100 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (2003). See generally Mark A. Silverman 
et al., Proposed Regulations Would Permit Cross-Border “A” Reorganizations for the 
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except to the extent of transferred intangibles.101 If the transfer is to 
a related party, then the U.S. multinational company transferor is 
treated as receiving annual payments for the use of the intangibles. 
These payments should be commensurate with the income from the 
intangibles over their useful lives.102 
 In addition, tax auditors usually spend an extensive amount of 
time examining the facts of a transfer pricing case, especially 
before contacting the taxpayer. Tax auditors in the U.K. have 
instructions to review information from many sources including 
internet searches, multinational corporate group websites, and 
commercial databases.103 The auditors must make a risk assessment 
about a multinational corporate group’s transfer prices.104  
 In preparing for a transfer pricing audit, government auditors 
should follow three general guidelines. They should (1) use “pre-
audit techniques,” (2) gain an understanding of taxpayer’s 
operations, and (3) review the balance sheets and income 
statements.105 Pre-audit techniques entail the review of the 
 
 
First Time in 70 Years, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2005-8326-1.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 101 I.R.C. § 367(d) (2005). This provision does not apply to the transfer of 
foreign goodwill or going concern value. 26 C.F.R. § 1.367(d)-1T(b) (2005). 
 102 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T(c) (2005). If the transfer is to an unrelated 
party, the fictional gain is immediately taxable. Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T(d) 
(2005). For discussion of the international transfer of the PwC trademark name and 
associated goodwill and its potential avoidance of I.R.C. § 367(d) (2005), see Lee A. 
Sheppard, PwC’s Transfer Pricing Case from Hell, 96 TAX NOTES 327, 331 (2002). 
 103 Other sources include press reports, trade magazines, the tax agency’s 
international library, and other government departments. See INTM 461230—Transfer 
Pricing: Case Selection—Risk Assessment: Review of Information from Other 
Sources, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/ 
manuals/intmanual/INTM461230.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 104 See, e.g., INTM 461200—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Risk 
Assessment—Detailed Process, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461200.htm (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2005). The risk assessment should examine six years of financial statements, 
the company’s website, its business, the multinational corporate group structure, the 
multinational company’s activities as reported in the trade press, comparables 
identified in a search of commercial databases, any controlled foreign corporation’s 
tax return, and various other items. Id.  
 105 For a summary of more specific guidance and procedures for large and mid-
sized business examinations, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, I.R.S. PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE ¶ 8.15 (2d ed. 2002). 





multinational company’s tax return,106 particularly the tax return 
forms or schedules for reporting related party transactions.107 
Auditors in the United States are expected to compute five financial 
ratios for the multinational company based on both tax and 
financial data.108 They then compare the ratios for the multinational 
company to relevant standard industry ratios.109 
 To obtain an understanding of a multinational company’s 
business operations, the U.S. Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 
provides more detailed instructions than similar information 
provided in other countries.110 Auditors often seek to understand a 
multinational company’s intangibles through a review of U.S. and 
foreign patents, trademarks, and prosecution files, together with 
research of patent litigation involving the multinational corporate 
group and review of copyright registrations.111 To understand the 
underlying business, auditors should further inquire whether a 
foreign affiliate multinational company has similar intangibles, 
 
 
 106 See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.1, Preaudit Techniques (Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076 (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) 
(citing I.R.S. Forms 5471 (Information Return with Respect to a Foreign Owned 
Corporation) and 5472 (Information Return of a Foreign Owned Corporation)). See 
also I.R.S. Form 8865, Schedule O (Transfer of Property to a Foreign Partnership) 
and Schedule P (Acquisitions, Disposition and Changes of Interests in a Foreign 
Partnership); I.R.S. Form 1120, Schedule M-3, revised for 2005, also provides a guide 
to auditors of corporate tax returns in reconciling net income with total assets shown 
for financial accounting statement purposes.  
 107 See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 16–17 (tax return 
disclosure requirements exist in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, the 
U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela). 
 108 See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.1 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/ 
part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076. The five ratios are: 1) gross profit to net sales, 2) net 
profit to net sales, 3) operating expenses to net sales, 4) gross profit to operating 
expenses [Berry ratio], and 5) operating profit to average total sales. 
 109 Id. For a list of references providing sources for more information on 
business comparisons and standard industry ratios, see The Library of Congress 
Business Reference Services, A Guide to Finding Business Information at the Library 
of Congress (June 20, 2005), http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/guide/guide1/guide1. 
html. 
 110 Documents for the review of international agents include annual reports, SEC 
filings (especially Forms 10-K or 20-F), customs entry documents, sales catalogs, and 
other relevant documents. Id. 
 111 I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.2(3), Understanding the Taxpayer’s Operations (Jan. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076.  
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whether technology transferred between the foreign affiliate 
multinational company and the U.S. multinational company, 
whether a cost sharing agreement exists, and whether a foreign 
affiliate multinational company bought into any cost sharing 
agreement.112 
 In conducting a review of the multinational company’s 
financial statements, particularly the balance sheets and income 
statements, the U.S. international examiner should obtain product 
line income statements from taxpayers engaged in controlled 
transactions.113 The auditor will likewise examine the multinational 
company’s financial statements over a multiple year period to see if 
business cycles or product life cycles provide an explanation.114 
The auditor must obtain various internally generated documents to 
help perform a functional analysis of the multinational company.115 
The auditor also needs information on foreign related entities, 
particularly their tax returns and bank records.116 In the outbound 
situation, an auditor should understand the relationship with foreign 
affiliates in the multinational corporate group.117 
 Audits often require an increased amount of information from 
multinational companies. Recently in the United States, this burden 
has arisen partly because the IRS counsel becomes involved prior 
to the audit.118 Moreover, document requests have become more 
 
 
 112 Auditors should also inquire who conducted the research and development, the 
nature of the research, whether the company used marketing intangibles to develop the 
product, who developed the marketing intangibles, and which members of the 
multinational corporate group advertised. Id. at (7). 
 113 I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.3(2), Reviewing Balance Sheets and Income (Jan. 1, 2002), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076 (last visited Mar. 
18, 2006). 
 114 Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(4). 
 115 Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(5) (examples of desired information include management 
reports, budgets, and audit reports). 
 116 Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(6). 
 117 I.R.M. 4.61.3.2(2), Final IRC Section 482 Regulations (Jan. 1, 2002), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e441996. Desired 
knowledge includes a foreign affiliate’s history and background, its formation, 
government benefits and incentives provided, its manufacturing facilities, personnel, 
products, transfers of intangibles, development of manufacturing intangibles, purchase of 
raw materials, and sales of finished products. 
 118 Before taxpayers forward any documents to the government official, they 
should review them to: 1) verify all information is correct, 2) determine if the 
information is consistent with the unit’s tax return, and 3) meticulously consider the 
effect of the information when given to the government tax auditors. See Howard Kuo, 
 





formal and the audit includes more depositions of key employees 
and third parties.119 If written documents do not support a risk 
allocation scheme, auditors will probably ignore them.120 Some 
governments (e.g., Canada) will even collect confidential third 
party information in transfer pricing audits.121  
 It is important for multinational corporate group advisers to 
understand audit triggers and effectively advise their clients on how 
to minimize the probability of a transfer pricing audit and its 
related burdens. Understanding the extensive preparation of many 
government auditors enables a multinational company to better 
prepare for an appropriate response. Multinational companies 
should also encourage governments to train their auditors on 
transfer pricing issues while preventing overzealous auditors from 
harassing multinational companies.  
 
B. Governments’ Transfer Pricing Audits of Intangibles:          
Audit Practice and Appropriate Auditor Behavior 
 
 Because tax auditor guidance varies significantly from country 
to country,122 this section describes several approaches to transfer 
pricing audits and highlights certain aspects of the audit process. 
Multinational companies operating in Asia are particularly 
concerned about transfer pricing audits in China and India.123 In 
countries such as China and India, local tax authorities conduct 
transfer pricing tax audits based on principles established by the 
national government to the extent such principles exist. 
 
 
Corporate Tax Management for Transfer Pricing Audits, http://www.pwc.com.vn/ 
extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/4bd5f76b48e282738525662b00739e22/92893e9ce39d6de
6ca256f77000da819/$FILE/Events%20and%20Trends%20Vol.%20171.pdf.  
 119 Alan Winston Granwell & James E. Brown, Coming Conflicts: Proposed 
U.S. Transfer Pricing Services Regulations and the Treatment of Intangibles, IBFD—
DERIVATIVES & FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (Sept./Oct. 2004), at 14 [hereinafter Coming 
Conflicts]. 
 120 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2) (2005). 
 121 See Martin Przysuski, Canada Reaffirms Use of Third-Party Information for 
Transfer Pricing Audits, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 205 (2004). 
 122 For example, on April 12, 2005, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance 
issued a seventy-six page document providing extensive administrative principles on 
expected transfer pricing documentation. See Christian Ehlermann & Andreas 
Kowallik eds., Worldwide: German Tax & Legal News, DELOITTE NEWSL., Apr. 2005.  
 123 Transfer Pricing Presents Greatest Risk for Companies in Asia, PwC Survey 
Says, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 92 (June 8, 2005). 
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 The transfer pricing audit in China is a two-step process: (1) the 
“desk audit” and (2) the field audit at the multinational company’s 
premises.124 The field audit occurs only if the desk audit finds 
insufficient support from the multinational company’s documents 
of the company’s position. Companies in China should receive at 
least three days advance notice before a field audit.125 
 During the field audit, the tax auditors usually question the 
Chinese partner in a joint venture about the multinational 
company’s related-party transactions.126 The tax auditors also try to 
obtain additional documents from the multinational company to 
facilitate their investigation.127 If the tax auditors believe that the 
Chinese multinational company is losing money through 
overpayment to a foreign parent corporation multinational 
company, the Chinese multinational company must make a 
convincing business case explaining the unique reasons for the 
loss.128  
 Transfer pricing audits occur in India if related party transactions 
exceed 50 million rupees (slightly over US$1 million). 129 India’s 
local “transfer pricing officer” (TPO) reviews the international 
transactions in an “on-desk audit.”130 India’s TPO has the authority 
to request documents from the taxpayers’ foreign affiliates.131  
 
 
 124 China, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-8 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
 125 Id. 
 126 AM. CHAMBER OF COM. CHINA, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRANSFER PRICING IN 
CHINA (2005) (information provided by Matthew Mui or Lynn Wang of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Beijing office).  
 127 See Spencer Chong & Rhett Liu, Transfer Pricing Investigation in China, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS PERSP. (Winter 2001), at 17. 
 128 For example, if the actual loss is five percent, while other companies in the 
industry are making a profit between three to eight percent. The Chinese multinational 
company might argue that low capacity utilization cost two percent, manufacturing 
defects cost one percent, foreign exchange losses cost two percent, and special start up 
costs cost four percent so that in the absence of these extra factors, the multinational 
company would have made four percent. AM. CHAMBER OF COM. CHINA, supra note 
125. 
 129 India, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-11 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
 130 Id. The “on-desk audit” is similar to the “office audit” in the United States 
where the revenue agent remains at the IRS location in contrast to a field audit where 
the revenue agent goes to the taxpayer’s premises.  
 131 Id. See generally, Samir Gandhi & Rakesh Alshi, Transfer Pricing Audits in 
India: The First Year Experience, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 842 (Dec. 8, 
2004). 





 The Australian Tax Office (ATO) also uses a two-step process 
for a transfer pricing audit. A “transfer pricing review” precedes 
any field audit action. The ATO’s transfer pricing review analyzes 
the multinational company’s documentation and interviews 
corporate officials.132 In the transfer pricing review, the ATO ranks 
the quality of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing process and 
documentation on a scale from one to five. A low score increases 
the likelihood of a transfer pricing audit.133  
 Often the guidelines for transfer pricing audits of intangibles 
are limited. For example, the U.K.’s HM Revenue and Customs 
lists four basic audit issues for intangibles. The revenue agent must 
(1) identify any intangibles, (2) determine precisely who owns 
them, (3) judge whether they have value at arm’s length, and (4) 
acquire expert assistance to pinpoint their value.134 Consequently, 
marketing intangibles beyond brand names are always open to 
question in the U.K.135 
 Comparatively speaking, the United States provides the most 
detailed and extensive transfer pricing audit instructions. U.S. 
international examiners must complete a functional checklist for the 
different activities performed.136 Examiners must also obtain expert 
assistance in economic analysis, which usually results in a stronger, 
more efficiently developed case.137  
 
 
 132 Simplified Approach, supra note 81, at 7. 
 133 Id. at 14. Weak documentation also lengthens the probable audit process, 
requiring auditors to remain at the taxpayer’s facilities longer and potentially hampering 
the multinational company’s daily operations. See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 
Brazil’s Fiscal Authority Approach. 
 134 INTM464070—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transaction: Intangibles: What 
are Intangibles?, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ 
intmanual/INTM464070.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 135 Id. 
 136 I.R.M. § 4.61.3-3, Presentation of Findings (Jan. 1, 2002). Some of the 
findings might arise from the auditor’s visit to specific locations, such as the 
taxpayer’s marketing office, manufacturing plants, distribution centers and 
warehouses, research and development centers, and quality control locations. I.R.M. § 
4.61.3(1), On-Site Visitations (Jan. 1, 2002). Auditors conduct such visits to develop a 
better understanding of the taxpayer’s marketing and advertising functions, the taxpayer’s 
foreign affiliates, the development and exploitation of the intangibles, and the degree of 
the parent company’s support. Id. at 3(2). 
 137 I.R.M. § 4.61.3.3, Economic Assistance (Jan. 1, 2002). 
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 Increasingly, teams of specialists conduct audits, as in China,138 
Belgium,139 and Portugal.140 An audit team generally includes an 
expert in international tax law, often an attorney or accountant. An 
economist selects comparables, determines arm’s length transfer 
prices, and values intangibles. A computer audit specialist assists in 
analyzing data from the multinational corporate group.141 An audit 
team might also have an industry specialist.142 
 Transfer pricing auditors should propose audit adjustments only 
where the multinational company deviated substantially from the 
arm’s length method. However, inappropriate audit adjustments 
often occur,143 including de minimus transfer pricing audit 
adjustments.144 Another type of inappropriate adjustment tactic is 
using the threat of an adjustment as a “bargaining chip” that is 
negotiated away in exchange for settlements on more meritorious 
issues.145 It is likewise inappropriate when auditors require proof 
that the local multinational company actually uses the licensed 
intangibles,146 or when auditors move straight to proposing a profit 
 
 
 138 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Revised Transfer Pricing Regulations: More 
Strengthened and Centralized Transfer Pricing Enforcement in China (Feb. 2005), 
http://www.pwccn.com/home/printeng/tp_cn_circular143_feb2005.html.  
 139 See Dirk Van Stappen, Belgium’s Transfer Pricing Provision, 14 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 38 (May 11, 2005). 
 140 See Laurie Wiggins et al., A Portuguese Perspective on Transfer Pricing, 14 
TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 33 (May 11, 2005). 
 141 William E. Bonano, Transfer Pricing Examinations, PILLSBURY WINTHROP & 
SUTRO LLP INT’L TAX BULL. (Feb. 1996). 
 142 In Spain, industry specialists are considered the most qualified to challenge a 
taxpayer’s transfer pricing. See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 65. In the U.S., the 
transfer pricing audit specialist might come from the “Industry Issue Resolution” program. 
See I.R.S. Notice 2000-65, 2000-52 I.R.B. 1. 
 143 For example, the I.R.S. Appeals Office “sustention rate,” the rate of agreeing 
with the revenue agent’s decisions made in Section 482 cases, was only thirty-four 
percent in 1998. See I.R.S., REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
SECTION 482 apps. A-C (Apr. 29,1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p3218.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) [hereinafter REPORT SEC 482]. 
 144 I.R.M. § 4.61.3.1(2), Development of IRC Section 482 Cases (Jan. 1, 2002). 
 145 Transfer Pricing: Alternative Practical Strategies, 890-1st BNA TAX MGMT. 
FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIO (2005). 
 146 See Robert J. Cunningham, The Future of International Transfer Pricing: 
Practical and Policy Opportunities Unique to Intellectual Property Foreign Transfer 
Pricing Audits of Intangibles, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 697 (2001–02) (this proof 
requirement occurs outside of the United States).  





split approach rather than considering the multinational company’s 
transfer pricing approach.147 
 Multinational companies should also prepare for possible 
transfer pricing audit negotiations for individual intangibles. A 
common audit concern arises when related parties pay royalties to 
each other when it is doubtful that the underlying intangibles are 
valuable.148 Indirect indicators can help determine an appropriate 
share of revenues from the intangible. These indicators include the 
significance of the individual intangible within the intangible 
basket or technology license, innovation from the intangible, the 
age of the intangible, and restrictions on the intangibles.149 
Multinational company representatives must be prepared to 
articulate persuasively the economic justification for the royalty 
amount. 
 In the United States, multinational companies may request 
government audits of specific issues involving factual 
determinations or the application of well-settled law to the facts.150 
The IRS now offers a joint audit planning process that enables 
companies to work with IRS specialists in the transfer pricing audit. 
Usually the focus is on procedural issues that can help shorten the 
audit cycle and benefit both the multinational company and the 
government. These issues include setting appropriate timelines for 
information document requests, sharing risk analysis, and reaching 
materiality agreements.151 When appropriate, an adviser outside the 
United States might also suggest a joint audit planning process 
 
 
 147 See OECD, Contribution Received from PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2, as part 
of Transfer Pricing: The OECD Launches an Invitation to Comment on Comparability 
Issues. See also Ken Okawara & Masanori Kawanobe, Japan Announces Results of 
Transfer Pricing Audits, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 (2000) (regional tax bureaus have 
often used the profit split method arguing there is no reasonable data available to 
apply). 
 148 See INTM 464100—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transaction—Intangibles: 
Royalties, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/ 
manuals/intmanual/INTM464100.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).  
 149 Other indicators include the type of competitive market impacting each 
intangible, the selling price erosion since the introduction of competitive products to the 
market, and the marketing developments for the intangibles. Cf. Contribution Received 
from BIAC [Business Industry Advisory Committee to OECD] 4, Transfer Pricing: 
The OECD Launches an Invitation to Comment on Comparability Issues, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/2/14554553.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). 
 150 Rev. Proc. 2005-12, 2005-2 I.R.B. 311. 
 151 Coming Conflicts, supra note 119, at 15. 
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during which the government will also audit the local multinational 
company within a reasonable period. 
Although countries may simultaneously conduct international 
transfer pricing audits,152 historically, few simultaneous audits have 
arisen given the challenges of coordinating each country’s audit 
cycles.153 As a result, government tax agencies instead choose to 
share company and industry information extensively.154 As standard 
auditing processes develop around the world, multinational 
companies should also consider sharing more information within 
the multinational corporate group about appropriate policies, 
responses, and defenses for any transfer pricing audit process. 
Worldwide, almost one-third of the transfer pricing audits 
generate a penalty.155 Mistakes in financial information or 
documentation156 may trigger such adjustments and penalties.157 
Thirty-seven countries charge penalties for transfer pricing 
abuses,158 and in many of them (such as Mexico,159 Kazakhstan,160 
 
 
 152 See CYM H. LOWELL ET AL., US INT’L TRANSFER PRICING ¶ 11.03[2][e], 
(2005). 
 153 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 4.78–4.93. In 1999, the United States had 
twelve working arrangements for simultaneous exams with the following countries: 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the 
Philippines, Sweden, and the U.K. See REPORT SEC 482, supra note 143, at app. A. 
 154 Further sharing of information among governments is expected with the draft 
2005 update to the OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME AND 
CAPITAL (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/24/34576874.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2006). For example, article 26(1) represents the change to allow 
information sharing when “foreseeably relevant.”  
 155 See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 16.  
 156 Vigorous Enforcement Expected in Latin America in 2005, 13 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 759 (2004). 
 157 Some countries might refer to “interest” as a penalty while other countries 
impose a separate interest charge. Interest attempts to recover the real time value of 
money. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 4.22. (1995). A penalty system, on the 
other hand, attempts to promote compliance. Id. ¶ 4.26. Rather than imposing penalties, 
Germany’s approach to the transfer pricing audit adjustment is to set the transfer price 
at the high end of the acceptable range. 
 158 See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 14–15. 
 159 See Albertina M. Fernandez, Tax Reform Gains Momentum in Latin America, 
16 TAX NOTES INT’L 1050 (Apr. 6, 1998) (US$250 million in Mexico). 
 160 See Kazakhstan: Canadian Oil Concern’s Kazah Subsidiaries Receive $76 
Million Assessment for 2002–2003, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 11 (May 
11, 2005). 





and Japan161), transfer pricing audits have increased revenues for 
their governments.  
Some countries have enacted a penalty structure resembling 
the U.S. penalty regime for valuation misstatements.162 The U.S. 
penalty structure recognizes that transfer pricing is as much an art 
as a science; therefore it grants wide latitude in determining 
transfer pricing.163 To determine if a penalty applies, governments 
typically require that companies report related party transactions on 
their income tax return.164 Often, countries provide a narrow 
exception to transfer pricing penalties,165 usually based on 
reasonableness.166 Multinational companies should lobby 
governments to increase the flexibility of transfer pricing penalties. 
Reviewing authorities in the government should have the power to 
 
 
 161 See also GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 53 (transfer pricing adjustments in 
2001 amounted to a total of 85.7 billion yen).  
 162 For example, Australia imposes a twenty-five percent penalty for other 
transfer pricing arrangements having a tax avoidance purpose and a fifty percent 
penalty for transfer pricing having the sole purpose of tax avoidance. However, these 
penalties receive respective reductions of ten percent or twenty-five percent if the 
multinational company has a reasonably arguable position. See TR 98/16, Income Tax: 
International Transfer Pricing–Penalty Tax Guidelines (Austl), available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=TXR/TR9816/NAT/ATO/00001 (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2006).  
 163 In the United States, a twenty percent valuation misstatement penalty applies if 
either a transfer price claimed on any tax return is 200% or more (or 50% or less) of the 
correct median transfer price determined under section 482 or the net section 482 transfer 
price adjustment for a year exceeds US$10 million. I.R.C. § 6664(e)(1)(B) (2005). The 
penalty doubles to forty percent in the case of a gross valuation misstatement if either the 
price claimed is 400% or more (or 25% or less) of the correct amount or the net section 
482 adjustment exceeds US$20 million. I.R.C. § 6664(h) (2005). 
 164 For instance, the Canada Revenue Agency may use Form T106 as a screening 
tool. See Kevin Bell, Response on Tax Form May Trigger Transfer Pricing Audit in 
Canada, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 806 (2004). 
 165 DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 16–17 (countries offering a 
potential reduction in penalties are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, The 
Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela). 
 166 In Australia, “penalties may be reduced if a taxpayer has a ‘reasonably arguable 
position’ in relation to the transfer pricing adjustment.” See Philip Anderson, PATA 
Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 199, 201 § 4.2.1 
(2003) (citing Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 § 222C (1936)). Canada 
requires “reasonable efforts to determine and use arm’s length transfer prices.” Canada 
Revenue Agency, Canadian Circular 87-2R International Transfer Pricing ¶ 179 
(1999). In the U.S., a “reasonable cause” and “good faith” exception exists to the 
penalties. 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-5(j)(5)(a) (2005). 
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reduce a penalty if they accept a multinational company’s defense 
against perceived tax avoidance. 
Multinational companies should also seek to reduce 
government tax audits by regularly performing internal audits of 
their subsidiaries to assess and correct any deficiencies. 
Multinational companies need to assess the ethical culture in their 
countries of operation to determine the extent to which they can 
rely on representations from the local multinational company.167 In 
the course of an audit, representatives can encourage diplomacy in 
the local affiliate’s response to government tax auditors—and 
exemplify it themselves—by asking questions in the context of civil 
conversation and limiting criticism to the audit rather than the 
auditor.168  
 Multinational companies sometimes want the “competent 
authority” of two governments to agree on a tax issue under audit. 
For example, the multinational company may request help from the 
“mutual agreement procedure” in a bilateral tax treaty to prevent 
double taxation.169 Through this approach, when one country makes 
a transfer pricing adjustment, the multinational company receives a 
correlative adjustment in the other country.170  
 As global transfer pricing audits become increasingly 
sophisticated, the audit of intangibles requires the transfer pricing 
audit team to use commercial judgment and valuation expertise. To 
perform this role effectively, multinational companies should 
encourage more governments to use professional teams of transfer 
pricing auditors with legal, accounting, and economic expertise.  
 
 
 167 Accounting firms have international exchange programs, partly to acquire an 
outside perspective on local multinational companies. An exchange helps to determine 
who makes the most reliable assessments rather than just presenting information that the 
outsider might like to hear. Author’s private discussion with PwC tax partner at the 2005 
PwC University for Faculty in New Jersey (June 16, 2004). 
 168 See generally Margaret Kent & Robert Feinschreiber, Contra-Audit Transfer 
Pricing Strategies, 17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1737 (Nov. 30, 1998). 
 169 For a discussion of proposed changes to the “mutual agreement procedure,” 
see Draft OECD Report on Competent Authority Issues, Possible Changes, 13 TAX 
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 423 (2004).  
 170 The I.R.S. offers a simultaneous Appeals/Competent Authority procedure 
under a tax treaty. See Rev Proc. 96-13, 1996-1 C.B. 616. In the United States, a 
taxpayer should file protective claims for refund if it expects a correlative adjustment 
from a transfer pricing settlement because any correlative adjustment affects the 
taxpayer’s income on a year to year basis. See Field Serv. Adv. TL-N-1354-01 (2001).  





 Transfer pricing audits are necessary to prevent multinational 
companies from engaging in inappropriate tax avoidance; however, 
the transfer pricing auditors should give broad leeway to the 
multinational company’s careful assessment of transfer prices. 
Multinational companies should not hesitate to remind auditors that 
their audit approach affects the multinational company’s investment 
decisions and the corresponding intellectual property expansion in 
the country. 
 
V. RESOLUTION OF TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS ON INTANGIBLES 
 
 Because government audit decisions affect company policy, 
forward-thinking companies value expeditious resolutions of audit 
issues. Sometimes the multinational corporate group or local 
company brings in additional outside advisers to help resolve any 
transfer pricing issues arising from the audit. However, a better 
strategy is to consider resolving probable transfer pricing issues in 
advance through agreement with the government, widely known as 
an Advance Pricing Agreement.  
 
A. Administrative Resolution, Especially with Advance Pricing 
Agreements (APAs) 
 
 Constructive resolution of transfer pricing audits usually 
requires the government tax authority and the multinational 
company to agree on both the facts and a set of applicable transfer 
pricing practices.171 Because efficiency is vital, optimal operations 
occur when both the multinational company and the government 
avoid inflexible positions. They should maintain open and frank 
dialogue, consider alternative ways to characterize the transactions, 
and remain flexible to resolve any differences.172 A government and 
a multinational company usually settle over ninety percent of cases 
prior to litigation,173 including transfer pricing audit cases.174 
 
 
 171 See Cym Lowell & Peter L. Briger, Adequacy of International Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 733 (2002). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Delegation Orders 236-237 cited in SALTZMAN, supra note 105, ¶ 8.15[6][a].  
 174 Khaled M. Diaw, Ownership Restrictions, Tax Competition and Transfer 
Pricing Policy, June 23, 2004, at 2 (according to claims by tax reform advocates at 
Senate Committee hearings in 1993). 
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Various methods generally exist for settling a tax dispute. 
Frequently, an administrative appeals review board within the 
government accomplishes settlements.175 Settlements may include 
accelerated issue resolution through consideration, mediation, or 
arbitration.176 For example, the European Arbitration Convention 
has helped settle transfer pricing disputes within the European 
Union (E.U.).177 To harmonize governments’ approach to applying 
the Arbitration Convention, the E.U. has adopted a “Code of 
Conduct on Transfer Pricing.”178 An administrative approach to 
settlement is more informal than litigation, which promotes frank 
discussion and mutual understanding.179 The favorite type of 
 
 
 175 Usually, an administrative appeals board does not publish their decisions. 
However, an exception exists in India. In a multinational corporate group case 
involving a French parent company and an Indian subsidiary that produced medical 
instruments, the Indian tax authority held that an interest-free loan was subject to 
transfer pricing coverage. See A.A.R. No. 609 (2003), Indian Advance Ruling 
Authority Decision on Applying Transfer Pricing Laws (New Delhi) (Nov. 24, 2004), 
reprinted in 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 967 (Feb. 2, 2005), cited in India: 
Ruling Board Says Transfer Pricing Laws Apply Even if Compliance Lowers Tax 
Liability, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 958 (Feb. 2, 2005). The Indian 
multinational company failed with its valid argument. The Indian Ruling Board held 
that the nondiscrimination provision of the Finland-India tax treaty could still apply 
transfer pricing concerns that did not apply to domestic related party transactions. 
Arguably, the ruling may have been necessary to increase the compliance for transfer 
pricing in India.  
 176 See I.R.M. 35.3.20, Mediation (Jan. 24, 1996); I.R.M. 35.3.20.1 Preliminary 
Considerations (Jan. 24, 1996). See also, ROBERT T. COLE, Arbitration of Transfer 
Pricing Disputes Under Tax Court Rule 124, in PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER 
PRICING 23.15 (2d ed. 2001). The U.S. Senate Finance Committee is expected to 
recommend arbitration when the IRS misses meeting case management timelines or 
when negotiations with foreign governments becomes unprincipled or inconsistent. 
See Finance Committee Draft Report Suggests JCT Review, Looking to ‘Bottom Line’ 
in APAs, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 154 (June 22, 2005).  
 177 Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the 
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, July 23, 1990, 90/463/EEC, 1990 
O.J. 225/10 (L 225) (EC). [hereinafter European Arbitration Convention]. See 
generally Gianmarco Monellato, France and Italy Settle First Case under Arbitration 
Convention, TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING (July 2003) (regarding “profit 
allocation between a manufacturer and a distributor”). 
 178 The E.U.’s Council of Finance Ministers adopted the Code. Proposal for a 
code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the 
E.U. COM (2005) 0543 final (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005PC0543:EN:HTML. See also 
Company Taxation: Commission Proposes Code of Conduct to Eliminate Double 
Taxation in Cross-Border Transfer Pricing Cases IP/04/542 (Apr. 27, 2004).  
 179 I.R.M. 8.6.1.2, Appeals Conferences (Feb. 18, 1999). 





settlement in the United States is the “Mutual Concession 
Settlement” in which neither party concedes the underlying issue.180 
If the relative values of the issues in an all-or-nothing situation are 
similar, parties may trade issues to reach a “Split Issue 
Settlement.”181  
 A company may also enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement 
(APA) with a government to preempt disputes by securing pre-
clearance on the multinational company’s transfer pricing. The 
APA determines the appropriate transfer pricing method, 
comparables, adjustments, and critical assumptions for the APA’s 
future duration.182 APAs for intangibles usually cover a “bundle of 
commercial property that when combined, form an entire business 
system.”183 In theory the APA represents a voluntary, binding 
contract between a government and a multinational company,184 
usually made after extensive pre-filing discussions185 (A 
government’s APA team186 must conduct due diligence to establish 
that the facts submitted by the multinational company are complete 
and accurate.187). In reality, however, governments sometimes force 
 
 
 180 I.R.M. 8.6.1.3.1, Mutual Concession Settlements (Feb. 18, 2003). 
 181 I.R.M. 8.6.1.3.2, Split Issue Settlements (Dec. 15, 2004) (settlements of 
penalty issues must be based on the merits and hazards of litigation surrounding each 
penalty). 
 182 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at G-1 (Glossary) (1996). See, e.g., Robert 
Weissler, Memorandum for APA Economists, in ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENT 
PROGRAM TRAINING MANUALS, reprinted in 10 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 
(July 5, 2000). 
 183 Austl. Tax Office, Advance Pricing Arrangement Program: Report of 
Developments in 2003-04 (Oct. 2004) [NAT 12082], available at 
http://www.ato.gov.au/print.asp?doc=/content/50911.htm. This bundle of intangibles 
can encompass “knowledge/know-how, business and IT systems, processes and 
procedures, specifications, trademarks, trade names and branding. Some elements may 
be protected by trademark and copyright and others by confidentiality agreements.” Id. 
 184 Id. at ann. 2004-26.  
 185 See, e.g., Ernst & Young, New Developments in Dutch APA/ATR Practice, 
Apr. 23, 2003. The Dutch planned to formalize pre-filing meetings to discuss facts and 
different options prior to the multinational company filing of the APA request. Id. 
 186 The APA team is similar to an audit team. A team leader coordinates contact 
with the multinational company. Team members are usually comprised of an 
international examiner, an economist, a lawyer, and perhaps other specialists 
(industry, tax treaty, or appeals officer). See I.R.S. Ann. 2004-26, 2004-15 I.R.B. 743 
(Apr. 12, 2004) (5th Annual APA Report in the U.S.). 
 187 See id. at ann. 2004-26. 
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companies into APAs.188 Another frustration is that not all 
companies seeking an APA or its renewal are accepted.189  
 Despite some shortcomings, APAs offer a number of 
advantages to companies.190 Notably, many companies primarily 
enter into an APA to acquire tax certainty rather than tax savings.191 
Tax certainty is often essential to effectively implement other 
international tax planning strategies.192 With an APA, the 
multinational company should have certainty for the APA’s 
duration, usually about five years.193 An APA can also substantially 




 188 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Before the I.R.S., APA Public Hearing (Feb. 
22, 2005) (statement of Wyman Atwell), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
apa/wal-mart_stores_-_wyman_atwell.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). About one-third 
of U.S. companies entered into an APA during an audit. Sean Foley, Principal KPMG, 
Comments at NYU Prof. H. David Rosenbloom’s Transfer Pricing Class (Apr. 8, 
2005).  
 189 Canada has discontinued APAs with about thirteen percent of companies. The 
companies sometimes withdrew from the APA program or had their applications 
revoked by the Canadian authorities. Global Transfer Pricing Update, 31 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 327 (July 28, 2003). 
 190 See e.g., Austl. Tax Office, Introduction to Concepts and Risk Assessment 
(Apr. 2005), at 3 [NAT 2725], available at http://www.ato.gov.au/ 
taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/35283.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) 
(explaining that benefits include reducing the possibility of double taxation, reducing 
record keeping burdens, and reducing business costs). 
 191 See Kevin A. Bell, U.S. Senate Panel to Review APA Program, 33 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 232, 232 (2004) (quoting Chris Faiferlick of Ernst & Young).  
 192 Judith P. Zelisko on behalf of Tax Executives Institute, The I.R.S.’ Advance 
Pricing Agreement Program, IRS Hearing, Feb. 22, 2005 [hereinafter IRS hearings]. 
In addition, some taxpayers view APAs as having restrained potential transfer pricing 
excesses of several countries. See Henry J. Birnkrant & Robert T. Cole, Remarks of 
Henry J. Birnkrant & Robert T. Cole, of Alston & Bird LLP on Advance Pricing 
Agreements, IRS Hearing, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
apa/alston_and_bird_-_henry_birnkrant _ and_robert_cole.pdf. 
 193 Slightly more than half of the APAs had five year terms and one-third had a 
term longer than five years. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-27 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
 194 See, e.g., Advance Pricing Agreements: Costco Resolves Dispute with 
Canada, U.S. Over Royalty Due U.S. Parent for 1996-2006, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER 
PRICING REP. 1093 (Mar. 16, 2005). The Costco APA covered intangibles, including 
know-how and trademarks. The SEC Form 8-K filing said net income was positively 
impacted by a one-time US$52 million income tax benefit resulting primarily from 
settlement of a transfer pricing dispute between the United States and Canada. Id. 





 APAs may be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.195 A 
unilateral APA is the most common type196 and only involves the 
multinational company and the government.197 A multinational 
company might prefer a unilateral APA when there is a concern 
that the request for an APA in another country might trigger an 
audit there.198  
 A bilateral APA is an increasingly popular solution199 that 
involves two governments negotiating to create a uniform standard 
that each will apply to the multinational corporate group.200 
Governments sometimes prefer bilateral APAs201 because they can 
have persuasive effect beyond the countries involved and influence 
government policies in third countries.202 
 In a multilateral APA, several countries jointly define how a 
multinational corporate group should set its transfer prices in those 
 
 
 195 The IRS released updated guidance on APAs in Rev. Proc. 2004-40, 2004-29 
I.R.B. 1. For APA procedures in China, see China’s Circular No. 118 (Guo Shui Fa No. 
118) (Sept. 3, 2004). For APA procedures in other countries, see BNA, Transfer Pricing 
European Rules and Practices (France, U.K., and Germany), 895 TAX MGMT.; BNA, 
Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and Practices Outside of Europe, Part I (Canada, 
Mexico, and Japan), 897 TAX MGMT.; and BNA, Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and 
Practices Outside of Europe, Part II (Korea, Australia, and Brazil), 898 TAX MGMT. 
 196 See Steven S. Saeger et al., Comment on PATA Guidance for Bilateral APAs, 
ITPJ (Jan./Feb. 2005), at 3–6.  
 197 See, e.g., Landwell & Associates [trans.], French Finance Ministry’s 
Unilateral APA Guidelines, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 191 (July 6, 2005) 
(reporting Administrative Reg. A4 A-11-05, issued June 24, 2005). 
 198 Sean Foley, Principal KPMG, Comments at NYU Transfer Pricing Class 
(Apr. 8, 2005). 
 199 See, e.g., Dutch Ministry Handling More A.P.A. Requests, Processing Fewer 
Unilateral, ‘Other’ Requests, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1100 (Mar. 16, 
2005). 
 200 For example, in 2003–04, Australia completed eight bilateral APAs involving 
Canada, the U.S., Japan, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. ATO, APA REPORT 
(NAT 12082-10.2004) (fig. 2 and accompanying text). In 2005, China and Japan 
entered into China’s first bilateral APA. China’s First Bilateral APA Concluded, 2005 
TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING. 
 201 See, e.g., U.K. TRANSFER PRICING GROUP, ERNST & YOUNG, U.K. TRANSFER 
PRICING GROUP, TRANSFER PRICING IN THE U.K. 15 (2004). Bilateral APA negotiations 
effectively resolve concerns about acquiring potential correlative adjustments by the 
other government tax authority. The multinational company seeking the APA 
contributes behind the scene to the discussion and negotiation between the relevant tax 
authorities of the two countries. 
 202 Prof. H. David Rosenbloom, Comments at NYU Transfer Pricing Class (Apr. 
8, 2005). 
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countries.203 A multilateral APA is most appropriate where a 
corporation conducts global trading or has become a globally 
integrated business.204 Multilateral APAs are a recent 
development205 and are still rare.206 However, multilateral APAs 
should increase dramatically, especially once the E.U. establishes 
coordinated transfer pricing procedures. 
 The United States207 and Australia created the first APAs in 
1991.208 At least twenty-four other countries have since formally 
adopted them.209 The APA procedures among countries are 
 
 
 203 See, e.g., Germany: Germany Aims to Streamline APA Process by Allowing 
Direct Negotiations with Berlin, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 57 (Sept. 29, 
2004). 
 204 For example, the first European multilateral APA was for Airbus, a leading 
European aircraft manufacturer. See Laurence Delorme et al., Airbus APA: Using 
Multilateral Agreements to Solve Complex Transfer Pricing Issues, 13 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 276 (July 21, 2004) (The multilateral APA was between 
France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.). 
 205 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, Annex: Guidelines for Conducting APAs 
under the Mutual Agreement Procedure, at AN-28 (1999). The first two multilateral 
European APAs were signed in 2004. See APAs Are Set to Take Off in Europe, 2004 
INT’L TAX REV. 37 (June 2004) [KPMG, available at kpmgbe.lcc.ch]. 
 206 Several countries have engaged in multilateral APAs. France has engaged in 
three multilateral APAs, all with E.U. countries. Michael Collet, Int’l Tax Inst. (3rd 
Annual) at Fordham Univ. (June 2, 2005) (paper and statement). As of the end of 
2004, the United States has engaged in eight multilateral APAs. Rev. Proc. 2005-27, 
I.R.B. 2005-16 (Apr. 18, 2005). Japan has engaged in at least four multilateral APAs. 
Caplin & Drysdale, International Tax: Negotiating Advance Pricing Agreements, 
available at http://www.capdale.com/practices/areadescriptions.asp?ID=50 (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2006).  
 207 The success of APAs in the United States arose in part because the U.S. APA 
Office is separate from the field office that conducts audits. This changes the 
dynamics for negotiation. Sean Foley, Principal KPMG, Comments at NYU Transfer 
Pricing Class (Apr. 8, 2005). The productivity of economists in evaluating cases 
illustrates the difference. The APA economists complete about one case per month 
while the transfer pricing audit economists complete one case every three months.  
 208 See Simon Phillipson, Australia Enters Multilateral Advance Pricing 
Agreement, 2 J. INT’L TAX’N 116 (1991). 
 209 Besides the United States and Australia, before 2001 APAs were authorized 
in Brazil (1997), Canada (1994), France (1999), Germany (2000), Japan (1987), Korea 
(1996), the Netherlands (1999), New Zealand (1994), and the U.K. (1999). See 
Japan’s Second Annual APA Report, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 587 
(2004). Other countries authorizing APAs in more recent years include Belgium, 
China, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela. See DELOITTE TOUCHE 
TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 28–29. Additionally, Austria, Indonesia, the 
 





substantially similar, but they have some procedural differences.210 
Parties do not generally publish APAs, unless the multinational 
company publishes them pursuant to litigation.211 However, public 
documents sometimes reveal basic information on APAs. 212 The 
United States was the first to introduce an annual government 
report on APAs.213 Other countries who now issue an annual APA 
Report include Australia, Canada, and Belgium.214 The APA 
Reports are informative, particularly in categorizing the actual 
approaches used in transfer pricing cases settled through an APA.215  
 Due to these benefits, the demand for APAs should increase. In 
the United States, strict compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
expected to motivate more multinational companies to enter into or 
renew APAs,216 and once companies have obtained APAs, they 
usually desire to renew them. Some taxpayers with APAs would 
 
 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland have engaged in APAs. ERNST & YOUNG, 
TRANSFER PRICING GLOBAL REFERENCE GUIDE 8, 33, 41, 55, 56 (May 2005). 
 210 See, e.g., Steven C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side Comparison of the APA 
Procedures: The United States and Australia, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 821 (2005); Steven 
C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side Comparison of the APA Procedures: The United States 
and France, 37 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195 (2005); Steven C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side 
Comparison of the APA Procedures: The United States and Japan, 37 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 401 (2005). For an example of the development of the APA program, see Bruno 
Gibert, Consolidating and Developing the French Advance Pricing Agreement 
Procedure, EUR. TAX’N (Feb. 2005). 
 211 An APA published in litigation is insightful for showing amounts allocated to 
intangibles for a pharmaceutical multinational company: twenty-eight percent of net 
trade sales as marketing commissions, five percent of net trade sales for the trademark, 
and three percent of net trade sales for the trade name. IRS APA for Dyazide, Tagamet, 
13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 922, app. A (Jan. 19, 2005). 
 212 See, e.g., Advance Pricing Agreements: Costco Resolves Dispute with 
Canada, U.S. Over Royalty Due U.S. Parent for 1996-2006, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER 
PRICING REP. 1093 (Mar. 16, 2005) The Costco APA covered intangibles, including 
know-how and trademarks. Costco’s SEC Form 8-K filing said net income was 
positively impacted by a one-time US$52 million income tax benefit resulting 
primarily from settlement of a transfer pricing dispute between the United States and 
Canada. See Costco Wholesale Corp., Form 8-K (May 26, 2005). 
 213 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2004-26, 2004-15 I.R.B. 743. 
 214 See Second Decade of APAs: Greater Transparency, 11 TAX MGMT. 
TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-3 (Mar. 5, 2003). 
 215 For example, in Canada a large number of APAs use a profit-split method when 
quality comparable transactions are not available. Canada Revenue Agency, APA 
Program Report 2003–2004 14, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/business/ 
apa_report04-e.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
 216 Large Multinationals, supra note 77, at 1093. 
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like the United States to enter into “synthetic bilateral APAs” with 
countries like Argentina and Brazil that do not have tax treaties 
with the United States.217 The APA process is not without its 
critics—it takes an average of over two years in the U.S.218—and 
some allege the APA process is broken.219 In 2005, the U.S. Senate 
reviewed the U.S. APA program and will probably recommend that 
the IRS harmonize the system by placing a dollar figure on the 
transactions covered by each APA.220 
 APAs have great promise, but the system needs further 
refinements. Simplified procedures may encourage more small to 
medium-sized businesses to participate in an APA program.221 
Governments must continue to invest more resources in the APA 
process for both hiring personnel and training APA teams. In 
addition, APA teams need greater expertise in order to develop 
industry specializations in complex areas where multinational 
companies seek integration across countries.222  
 Companies should consider obtaining APAs. They are not 
panaceas; however, to resolve transfer pricing audits 
administratively, it is essential that the multinational corporate 
group have credibility with the relevant governments. APAs are 
only part of the process; the corporate group establishes credibility 
primarily through the sum of its actions, which consists of the 
quality of its transfer pricing documentation and its responsiveness 
to government inquiries.  
 
 
 217 See John Mitchell, Vice-President, Eaton Corp, IRS APA Hearings, Feb. 1, 
2005, available at http://apps.irs.gov/pub/irs-apa/eaton.pdf. 
 218 Similarly, taxpayers sometimes complain that APA renewal is more time 
consuming than needed. See, e.g., Daniel Karen & Pat Breslin, IRS APA Hearing 
Urges Fairness (and Funding) Over Consistency, 6 TAX NEWS AND DEV. 13 (Feb. 
2005).  
 219 Peter Blessing, Int’l Tax Inst. (3rd Annual) at Fordham Univ. (June 3, 2005) 
(moderator of the New U.S.-Int’l Env.: Gov. Roundtable) 
 220 See Lee Sheppard, Draft Senate Finance APA Report Shows Incompetent 
IRS, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 119-1 (June 22, 2005). 
 221 See Notice 98-65, 1998-2 CB 803 (special APA procedures for small 
business in the U.S.); cf. Deloitte, French Tax Administration Announces Measures to 
Improve APA Program, THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD, 2 (Feb. 2005). 
 222 The United States will create specialized APA teams in five areas 
(automotive, financial products, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and cost sharing). 
These five areas have consumed fifty-six percent of the total case time during the past 
two years. See Molly Moses, Practitioners Hail Changes to APA Program Designed 
to Speed Cases, Increase Accountability, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 3 
(May 11, 2005).  





B. Litigation is a Risky Solution 
 
 In most countries, little or no transfer pricing case law exists,223 
especially regarding intangibles.224 Even though companies who 
litigate over intangibles usually achieve partial success, litigation is 
risky for multinational companies. There is a lack of litigation 
partly because litigation on complex tax cases often takes over five 
years from the first year at issue.225 Given that rigorous worldwide 
transfer pricing regulation has only occurred within the last decade, 
more cases are likely to arise in the future. 226 For instance, 
multinational companies operating in Canada are increasingly 
turning to Canadian courts.227 Another possible reason for lack of 
case law on these issues may derive from the fact that governments 
usually litigate only those cases presenting broad compliance 
issues. 
 Internationally, most transfer pricing case law has failed to 
provide a relatively predictable rationale for the court’s 
decisions.228 In Russian courts, the government’s transfer pricing 
arguments have continuously failed in court because the tax 
authorities lack either essential expertise, resources, or economic 
data to establish a market rate.229 Transfer pricing in Russia has 
 
 
 223 See Transfer Pricing Cases Around the World, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER 
PRICING REP. 970 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
 224 Transfer pricing cases on intangibles have arisen in Belgium (No. 
1997/FR/33) and Germany (6 K 1910/98). Id. In 2001, Korea’s first transfer pricing 
case involved royalties paid to the U.S. parent. See Youngjin Jung, First Korean Case 
on Transfer Pricing Comparability: Dubious Conclusions, Statistical Errors, J. INT’L 
TAX’N (2004).  
 225 See, e.g., Transfer Pricing Cases Filed in Argentina; First Lawsuit Expected 
Soon in Mexico, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 737 (2004). 
 226 Litigation: First Half of 2004 Shows Eightfold Increase in Allocations: Cases 
Filed Double from 2003, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 253 (Jul. 21, 2004).  
 227 See Molly Moses, As Negotiations Falter, U.S. Competent Authority ‘Not 
Discouraging’ Litigation in Canadian Courts, 10 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 
559 (Sept. 29, 2004). However, no Canadian cases have addressed inter-company 
transfer of intangibles. See Nathan Boidman, Canada, Transfer Pricing: Foreign 
Rules and Practice Outside of Europe, 897-1st BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (in the 
text after note 105). 
 228 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Arm’s Length Standard in the 21st Century: A 
Proposal for Both Developed and Developing Countries, TAX NOTES INT’L 241, 255 
(Oct. 18, 2004). 
 229 See Dmitry Rybko and Biaino Kutanina, Russia Paying Close Attention to 
Transfer Pricing Rules, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 885 (Dec. 22, 2004). 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 2 
 
198 
acquired considerable attention because of a US$11 billion suit 
between two companies within the Yukos multinational corporate 
group.230  
 Since the United States has the most extensive litigation history 
regarding transfer pricing issues, U.S. case law occasionally 
influences other countries.231 U.S. cases on intangibles have 
focused predominantly on the high-value intangibles and patents, 
trademarks, and their licensing; and the U.S. government has lost 
most of these transfer pricing cases.232 This may be due to the 
complexity of transfer pricing cases, which seem to overwhelm the 
tax court.233 However, U.S. case law mostly consists of applying the 
ancient 1968 transfer pricing regulations. When the courts start to 
apply the more sophisticated 1994 or subsequent regulations, a 
different result may occur. 
 Those who engage in transfer pricing litigation over intangibles 
should be aware of some significant taxpayer victories. In the U.S. 
Tax Court Sundstrand case,234 the intangible was a license for 
manufacturing an aircraft engine part. The court upheld the 
multinational company’s licensing agreement using evidence of 
 
 
See also Russia: Significant Amendments Proposed, Tax Planning Int’l Trans. Pricing 
11 (June 2005). 
 230 Court to Proceed on $11 Billion Lawsuit Against Yukos for Abusive Transfer 
Pricing, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1231 (Apr. 27, 2005). 
 231 See, e.g., Diahatsu Australia Pty Ltd v. FCT [2001] FC 588 (Australia). See 
also, John George Azzi, Challenging an Australian Transfer Pricing Determination in 
Light of the Daihatsu Decision and the Hickman Principle, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 159, 
170–71 (2003). 
 232 The U.S. government was actually successful in litigating Medieval 
Attractions, N.V., v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. 924 (1996). The government’s success 
was probably because the case involved a tax haven. A multinational company paid 
franchise fees of restaurant and entertainment services to a related Netherlands 
Antilles entity (tax haven multinational company). This tax haven company in turn 
paid guarantee fees to Spanish investors. The U.S. Tax Court denied the deduction for 
the payments to the foreign affiliates because the U.S. multinational company 
developed the intangibles. The payments lacked “economic substance” and were 
undertaken solely for tax avoidance purposes. Id. 
 233 This complexity was expressly noted in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 634 (1993). This case involved licenses with a 
nonexclusive right to use and sell equipment, as well as an exclusive right to 
manufacture it in Puerto Rico. Because the IRS changed its reason for the assessment 
before trial, the U.S. Tax Court concluded the IRS’s reallocation was arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at part III (9598). 
 234 Sundstrand v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 226 (1991). 





similar intangibles to third parties. Sundstrand’s Singapore affiliate 
was successful in using location savings to justify higher than 
normal profits. In another case involving the license of a U.S. 
company’s pharmaceutical drug patents to a Puerto Rican 
subsidiary in a section 351 tax-free incorporation,235 the courts 
found that at least part of the IRS’ assessment was arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable.236  
 Courts have even rejected the arguments of both governments 
and multinational companies, especially when a court finds that the 
parties’ analysis is incomplete.237 As illustrated in H Group 
Holding,238 a court typically uses its “best judgment” to reach its 
own conclusion. The issue in H Group Holding was Hyatt hotel 
chain’s trade name, trademark, and management services for its 
reservation system and corporate overhead. Hyatt claimed that its 
brand names were not a significant factor in the hotel industry. The 
IRS applied the residual profit-split method to reallocate a royalty 
to the parent company Hyatt. Consequently, the U.S. Tax Court 
created a royalty rate of 1.5% for the foreign subsidiaries’ use of 
the Hyatt management services and a rate of 0.4% for the trademark 




 235 Governments also sometimes audit pharmaceutical companies for their use of 
research and development (R&D) tax benefits. In the U.S., R&D is either deducted 
under I.R.C. section 171 or serves as a “tax credit” (dollar for dollar reduction) under 
I.R.C. section 41. See generally, IRS, Pharmaceutical Industry Research Credit Audit 
Guidelines (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ 
2004pharrd.pdf. 
 236 Defining the tax avoidance problem too narrowly as property transferred to a 
Puerto Rico possessions corporation, Congress added I.R.C. section 936(h) for 
intangibles transferred to a possessions corporation under a non-recognition section, 
such as section 351. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987). See 
also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 996, 1131 (1985), aff’d on this issue, rev’d in 
part, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988) (Companies have the burden for showing that the 
government’s allocation was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.); Merck & Co. v. 
Comm’r, 24 T.C. 73, 91 (1991). See generally ROBERT T. COLE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
U.S. TRANSFER PRICING 24.03[A] (2d ed. 2001).  
 237 See, e.g., Seagate Technology v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 149, 163 (1994) (The 
court constructed a royalty rate for the technology and know-how for hard disk drives 
using licensing agreements of similar patents). 
 238 H Group Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 334 (1999). 
 239 Hyatt and the IRS subsequently settled the case in more detail. See 
Settlements: Hyatt Group Resolves §482 Issues for Service, Royalty Fees From 
Affiliates, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 123 (2003). 





 The worldwide growth of transfer pricing concerns makes it 
more essential that corporate advisers of multinational companies 
understand transfer pricing audit triggers, audit processes, and 
methods to resolve significant tax disputes. A multinational 
company adviser ought to communicate with various executives in 
a multinational company about preparing for a transfer pricing 
audit to understand what is likely to happen during an audit and to 
resolve it satisfactorily. 
 Increasingly, multinational companies must perform substantial 
functional, risk, contractual, and economic analyses throughout 
their worldwide operations. At the same time, government tax 
auditors ought to increase the sophistication in their APA teams in 
order to audit multinational companies and their transferred 
intangibles more fairly. 
 Contemporaneous documentation throughout the multinational 
company is critical in this whole process. Failure to conduct 
appropriate analyses or to document transfer pricing policies could 
and should result in significant transfer pricing adjustments and 
related penalties. These costs should be transparent in either the 
company’s financial statements or security filings with a 
government’s securities regulator. However, documentation 
requirements for small companies should not require excessively 
expensive transfer pricing studies that discourage worldwide 
business expansion.  
 Advisers should encourage multinational companies to consider 
entering into some type of APA with at least one government. 
Litigation is a risky approach for a multinational company even 
though the multinational company with an intangible at issue in a 
transfer pricing audit will usually achieve partial success. While 
there have been relatively few transfer pricing cases focusing on 
intangibles outside the United States, more are expected soon. 
 
